A framework for diagnosing board effectiveness by Nicholson, Gavin & Kiel, Geoffrey
  
 
   COVER SHEET 
 
 
Nicholson, Gavin J and Kiel, Geoffrey C (2004) A Framework for Diagnosing Board Effectiveness. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 12(4):pp. 442-460.
 
 
Accessed from   http://eprints.qut.edu.au
 
 
Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing.  
A FRAMEWORK FOR DIAGNOSING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS* 
 
 
 
 
 
Gavin J. Nicholson 
School of Business  
University of Queensland 
PO Box 2140 
Milton QLD 4064 
Australia 
Tel: +61 7 3510 8111 
Fax: +61 7 3510 8181 
E-mail: g.nicholson@competitivedynamics.com.au 
 
Geoffrey C. Kiel 
School of Business 
University of Queensland 
Brisbane QLD 4072 
Australia 
Tel: +61 7 3365 6758 
Fax: +61 7 3365 6988 
E-mail: g.kiel@business.uq.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Paper presented at the 6th International Conference on Corporate Governance and 
Board Leadership, Henley Management College, 6-8 October 2003 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in Corporate Governance: An International Review 
 
 
 2
A Framework for Diagnosing Board Effectiveness 
Abstract 
Pressure on boards to improve corporate performance and management 
oversight has led to a series of inquiries and reports advocating governance reform.  
These reports largely reflect an agency perspective of governance and seek to ensure 
greater board independence from and control of management. 
While board independence is important to good governance, we contend that 
frameworks, models and advice centred on one element of governance ignore the 
complexity of how boards work.  We develop a holistic board framework of how boards 
work based upon the concept of board intellectual capital to address this concern.   
Our framework proposes a series of inputs (company history, company 
constitution, legal environment) that lead to a particular mix of board intellectual 
capital.  We contend that the balance of the elements of board intellectual capital will 
lead to a series of board behaviours.  Further, the board needs to mobilize its intellectual 
capital to carry out a series of roles.  The exact nature of these roles will depend on the 
company’s requirements.  Thus, the governance outputs of organizational performance, 
board effectiveness and director effectiveness will depend on the match between the 
board’s intellectual capital and the roles required of it.  
We conclude by demonstrating the benefits of this framework as a diagnostic 
tool.  We outline how boards wishing to improve their governance systems can diagnose 
common governance problems by evaluating their own board’s capabilities in relation 
to the different components of the framework. 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR DIAGNOSING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, boards of directors are assuming an 
increased importance in business life.1  Understanding how boards work is not a simple 
task, however.  If grasping how an individual will behave is difficult, the complexity 
involved in understanding how a group goes about overseeing the operations of 
organizations, often comprising hundreds or thousands of individuals, is daunting.  
Despite this complexity, the health of our organizations, economies and society rely on 
us understanding how boards can influence firm performance.  There are three major 
factors that dictate how a board functions and how it achieves a greater degree of 
control over governance outcomes.  First, institutional and historical factors constrain a 
board’s composition, powers and actions.  Second, each board has a capability set that 
will enable it carry out the role set required of it to varying degrees.  Third, various 
board level interventions will result in changes to this capability set and so different 
organizational outcomes. 
Understanding how these factors interact requires a range of tools.  The 
conceptual framework or model is a key tool, because it indicates which factors (in the 
board, for example) are central to the topic of interest.  A framework also highlights 
how these factors are related to one another or which factors (or combination of factors) 
will cause changes to others.  Thus, developing an understanding of how boards work 
requires a holistic framework to guide investigations. 
Models of how boards work are central to corporate governance research and 
practice; they dictate the type of data collected, the analysis process employed and, from 
a practitioner’s perspective, the action plan that is developed.  Everyone working with 
or researching boards has developed an implicit model to guide their decision-making.  
These models are generally tacit and built from previous experiences resulting in 
“partial models” that vary in quality and complexity with the model builder.  
Academically, corporate governance has sparked several lines of research based on 
particular paradigms and models.  For instance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed an 
integrative model that could be used to study how the roles and attributes of the board 
influence firm performance, Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998) model is used to 
investigate the dynamics of the board-CEO relationship, and in particular board 
independence from the CEO, and Boyd (1990) devised a model to determine whether 
boards respond to different types of environmental uncertainty.  
Despite the abstract nature of frameworks and models (Sutton & Staw, 1995), 
partial models need to adequately reflect reality.  There is a significant risk that many 
existing corporate governance models fail this test.  For instance, much corporate 
governance research has concentrated on agency theory and the role of the board in 
monitoring management to minimize agency costs.  Similarly, this attention is evident 
in normative literature and news services that delight in exposing management excess.  
Despite the press, academic and practitioner interest, however, there is general 
agreement that the evidence does not support assumed agency relationships (e.g., in a 
meta-analysis of 54 studies of board composition, Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson 
(1998) found no substantive relationship between board composition and firm 
performance.  In a similar meta-analysis based on 37 previous studies, Rhoades, 
Rechner and Sundaramurthy (2000) concluded that board composition, or more 
specifically the proportion of outside directors, had an inconsequential relationship with 
firm performance).   
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In response, our aim is to develop a holistic framework for examining how 
boards of directors affect corporate outcomes.  Rather than relying on any single 
governance research agenda (such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory, etc.), we outline a general framework that conceptualizes the board 
as part of a governance system.  Specifically, we adapt Nadler and Tushman’s (1980) 
approach to model building and argue that an effective corporate governance system 
requires a series of components to be in a state of congruence or alignment.  
This paper is divided into four sections. The first is a broad overview of the 
framework including its main components and the relationships between them.  The 
second details the dynamic nature of the model and how the components interact.  In the 
third section we demonstrate how boards can use the model to analyze their own 
governance problems.  Finally, we discuss the model’s implications for how we think 
about boards and their impact on corporate performance. 
A Systems View of the Board–Performance Relationship 
There are many different ways of thinking about boards of directors and how 
they may influence corporate performance.  Asking a director or senior manager to 
“draw a picture of an organization” usually results in “some version of a pyramidal 
organizational chart” (Nadler & Tushman, 1980: 37).  The board of directors, often 
drawn as one box, will invariably sit at the top of this structure, indicating a static role 
and set of relationships, generally with one individual – the CEO.  This is a very limited 
way to conceptualize where the board fits and what it does.  The formal and hierarchical 
nature of this representation reflects the predominant view of the board as a mechanism 
to monitor management and control agency costs.2 
This hierarchical representation suffers several deficiencies.  It ignores major 
attributes of boards such as group and individual behaviours and relationships between 
board members and with management.  Similarly, impacts of the external and internal 
environment, informal (as opposed to formal) relationships, ethics and the distribution 
of power are not addressed.  Because it ignores many of the critical elements of 
corporate governance, the hierarchical model is restricted and moribund. 
There is growing recognition that broader conceptualizations of how boards add 
value to their firms are required (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  Innovative 
researchers have outlined how boards can add value by reviewing key decisions (Pound, 
1985), advising in the strategy process (Golden & Zajac, 2001), counselling 
management (Westphal, 1999), and providing access to key resources such as 
information (Baysinger & Zardhoohi, 1986), capital (Burt, 1983; Mizruchi & Stearns, 
1988), or industry contacts (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Investigations such as these have led to a growth in interest in issues of power 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995), board dynamics (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and interpersonal 
relationships at the top of organizations (Charan, 1998). 
Unfortunately, this wave of innovation does not appear to be reflected in legal 
systems or governance practice.  Rather than embracing recent academic advances, 
normative and legal perspectives appear bound to the entrenched agency paradigm of 
how a board adds value.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United 
States decrees that all listed companies must have an audit committee, all members of 
which must be independent, and that various other conditions relating to the 
independence of the auditor must be met.  The Act also declares that agency costs such 
as loans, bonuses and profits are either prohibited or may be forfeited in certain 
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circumstances.  This trend is paralleled in the international arena.  For instance, in both 
the United Kingdom (e.g., Higgs Review (Higgs, 2003)) and Australia (e.g., ASX 
Corporate Governance Guidelines (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003); 
CLERP 9 (Commonwealth Treasury, 2002)), reviewers concentrate on the agency 
perspective of governance and the role of independence in monitoring and controlling 
agency costs.3   
Instead of describing particular elements of corporate governance (such as 
agency theory) or specific board behaviours (such as monitoring), we propose a general 
model that conceptualizes the board as a social phenomenon.  As social phenomena, 
boards display many of the attributes of a natural system, and so we propose to view 
boards as dynamic and open social systems (Katz & Kahn, 1978).  Thus, this framework 
describes the relationships between the board and corporate performance as a set of 
interrelated elements where a change in one element will affect other elements in the 
system.  Furthermore, a board is an open system, in that the board will need to interact 
with the firm’s environment, both the external operating (or business) environment and 
the internal (or organizational) environment.  We follow Nadler and Tushman (1980) by 
conceptualizing the basic system as three elements.  Inputs from the environment are 
subjected to a transformation process in order to produce various outputs.  This is 
represented in figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A typical board consists of different but related components (for example, 
policies and procedures, various personal and organizational relationships as well as 
individual directors’ knowledge, skills and abilities).  The board receives a number of 
inputs, such as information, environmental feedback, legal constraints and so on, and 
will need to transform these inputs into certain outputs such as board and corporate 
performance.  As a result, the board will exhibit the following characteristics: 
Internal interdependence:  The components of the board are interrelated and 
changes in one component will normally affect other components.  For instance, a 
change in board policy may lead to a change in the way board members interact. 
Capacity for feedback:  Information about the board’s outputs (e.g., board 
effectiveness or corporate performance) can be used to control the system. Our 
framework explicitly recognizes that a board has the capacity to become a self-
correcting system.  For instance, if the board realizes it is failing to perform a 
specific function effectively, it can take action to rectify the situation.  
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this potential will be realized. 
Equilibrium:  When an event pushes the system out of balance, it will react and 
change to bring itself back into balance.  For instance, if there is a change in board 
composition, we would predict that there would be a period of instability while 
relationships and policies change to reflect the different knowledge, skills, abilities 
and behaviours brought about by the change in composition.  Although this may 
take a substantial period of time (and may in fact lead to further changes at board 
or management level), the system will move toward a new equilibrium. 
Equifinality:  In any system there is no one best way or, more precisely, different 
board configurations can lead to the same or similar board outputs.  For example, 
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if a board needs to raise equity, it may be able to use its knowledge and skill to 
develop an innovative financing structure.  Alternatively, it may be able to call on 
social contacts to provide access to the capital.  In both cases, the desired output 
(raising capital) has been achieved through different transformational mechanisms. 
Adaptation:  Only board systems that maintain a balance with the environment 
will survive.  Thus a board will adapt to changing environmental conditions and 
organizational demands or it will be forced to change (through board turnover or 
organizational decline).  If a board is faced with changes in the regulatory 
environment, for example, it may need to adapt its composition, policies or 
operating procedures.  Boards that fail to adapt to changing conditions are at 
significant risk of failure.  
While the framework outlined in figure 1 provides a simple interpretation of 
how social systems theory may be applied to the board-performance relationship, it is 
too abstract to analyze specific board performance problems.  Thus, any framework 
based on this general systems example needs greater specificity in how boards interact 
with their organizations and environments to accurately represent the complex and 
dynamic relationships involved.  
A social systems approach to boards is a way to unify existing theoretical and 
empirical investigations of how boards impact on corporate performance.  In particular, 
it provides an analytic tool specific enough for use in normative and academic settings, 
while still reflecting the basic characteristics and concepts of a systems approach.   
An Intellectual Capital Framework of Board Performance 
Boards add value to organizations through the transformation process set out in 
figure 1.  Thus, we place greatest emphasis on the transformational process in the 
framework, particularly the interaction of the various components of this process.  
Boards and researchers interested in understanding how a board can add value need to 
be aware of the interdependence and consequences of the interaction of these 
components.  The various components make up a board’s capability to add value (i.e. its 
intellectual capital – see below) and, when a board is stable, these components will be in 
fit or balance with one another.  In effective boards these various components fit well; 
in the case of an ineffective board they fit badly and lead to governance dysfunction.  
Thus, the basic premise of our framework is that an effective board will have an 
effective fit between the various elements of its intellectual capital in light of the roles 
required of it.  Similarly, a poorly performing board will have a poor fit between the 
components of board intellectual capital and the roles required of it.   
The concept of balance or fit is not new and similar models are often termed 
congruence models (e.g., see Homans, 1951; Leavitt, 1965; Nadler & Tushman, 1980).  
To avoid confusion, we define our approach as an intellectual capital framework for 
boards of directors.  This framework applies Nadler and Tushman’s (1980) congruence 
model of organizational behaviour to the board of directors.   
The framework employs the construct of intellectual capital, an area of 
increasing interest to management scholars.  In particular, we draw upon Stewart’s 
(1997) and Bontis’ (1999) conceptualizations of intellectual capital.  The framework is 
also indebted to the seminal governance review articles of Zahra and Pearce (1989) and 
Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996), which guide our understanding of a board’s roles.  
This framework seeks to explain how a board’s intellectual capital brings about board 
behaviours and this pattern of behaviour ultimately links to corporate performance.  By 
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linking a board’s intellectual capital to its roles, inputs and outputs, we are providing a 
holistic approach to how boards function and the behaviour of board members. 
Inputs 
The inputs to our model are the specific boundaries within which each board 
needs to operate.  Every organization and board is presented with a different set of 
operating conditions or material factors that are outside of its direct control that 
determine the boundary conditions within which the board operates (Nadler & 
Tushman, 1980: 39).  We propose there are four such inputs to the board-performance 
relationship, outlined in table 1.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first input is organization type; this input recognizes the nature and purpose 
of the organization being examined.  Irrespective of corporate form, every organization 
is established to achieve an overarching purpose and this purpose can have a powerful 
impact on board composition, board roles and ultimate corporate performance (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 1996; Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  More specifically, organization type needs 
to identify whether a company was formed with for-profit motives, philanthropic 
objectives, government policy objectives, some other specific non-profit objectives or 
even some combination of these generalized objectives.4   
Organization type will affect the corporate governance system in two important 
ways.  First, it will most often determine the degree to which a company has an 
articulated purpose that is clearly understood by all owners, directors and managers.  A 
key but often-overlooked element of the agency dilemma is the necessity to ensure that 
the goals of the owners are clearly transmitted to the managers (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hendry, 2002) and organization type can have a significant impact on this problem.  For 
instance, most for-profit companies have clearer objectives than most not-for-profit 
companies.  Second, and similarly, organization type determines the constituency base 
of the ownership or membership of the company.  In particular, it will be important 
whether these multiple constituencies have differing (though similar) objectives.  For 
example, the objective of a corporate retailing cooperative may be to support the retail 
distribution businesses of the owners/members.  While this appears a clear objective, the 
different needs of large versus small retailers (e.g., large retailers may benefit from 
training materials, while the smaller retailers may benefit more from shared IT systems 
and support) will most likely complicate corporate objectives.  Even traditional for-
profit companies can suffer from similar dilemmas.  For example, the rapid rise of 
ethical investment funds (Dunfee, 2003; Hildrey, 2003) clearly indicates that profit is 
not always the single motivator of investors. 
The company’s legislative and societal framework is the second input of the 
framework.  All companies operate within a set of rules established by the society(ies) 
within which they operate.  For every organization there will be a law which gives it 
legal existence.  For most organizations this will be a general law which allows the 
formation of corporations by individuals or groups of people (e.g., the Delaware 
Corporation Laws in the United States; the Companies Act 1989 in the United 
Kingdom, and the Corporations Act 2001 in Australia).  Most countries have a range of 
such laws that provide different powers and constraints for different types of 
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organizations.  For example, in Australia there is the Corporations Act, which creates 
companies, state based Incorporated Associations Acts, Cooperatives Acts and so on.  
In rare instances, organizations are created by specific acts that apply only to them.  For 
example, in the United States and Australia, universities are created by acts of the state 
legislatures; in the United Kingdom they are created by individual acts of the House of 
Commons.   
Additionally, there are a range of other laws which impact the governance and 
operations of the organization.  These often apply to all organizations (such as equal 
opportunity legislation or privacy legislation) or sometimes to a specific category of 
organization such as specific mining laws.  In rare instances, the law may even apply to 
a specific company.  Consequently, there are two key legal questions – what are the 
major legal duties of the board required by general law and, second, do any specific 
laws (either legislation or case law) apply to this organization. 
In addition to these legal requirements, societal customs often have a major 
impact on how boards operate.  For instance, in many societies business success relies 
on relationships between trusted individuals.  In these countries, companies find it 
necessary to appoint directors with the appropriate social contacts.  Similarly, there may 
be cultural factors, such as power distance (Hofstede & Bond, 1984), that place 
significant constraints on internal governance arrangements, particularly if the company 
is expanding beyond its traditional geography.  
The third major input is the organization’s constitution.  While society 
constrains companies through a legislative framework, the owners or members of the 
organization set the relationships between owners, directors and managers through the 
constitution.  Normally this will centre on issues of board process and policy that can 
have a substantial impact on the board’s functioning and effectiveness (e.g., who can be 
an owner, who can be a director, how often various meetings must occur, powers 
reserved by the company in general meeting, etc.).  There may also be a series of 
voluntary agreements (such as shareholder agreements) that supplement the constitution 
and need to be considered as part of any diagnosis. 
The fourth input, company history, is somewhat different from the previous 
three.  This is because the previous three inputs reflect the constraints within which the 
board operates – the purpose of the company, its legal framework, and the agreed 
division of powers.  The fourth input reflects the broader influences of past events.  It is 
very important to understand the major phases of a company’s development and the 
impact of these past events on current corporate governance expectations.  For example, 
past performance, corporate culture, values and decisions on the board’s composition 
will affect how a board functions.   
Company history is often the most important input, because it dictates two key 
elements of the process.  First, it will affect who will be on the board – organizational 
lifecycle, previous performance and existing director networks all play an important part 
in attracting directors.  Second, company history will often dictate what a board does.  
Legacy systems abound in corporate governance and what a board is doing and how it 
does it will often be a result of the unquestioned organizational history. 
The final input is the organization’s strategy, where we define strategy as how a 
company uses its resources (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).  Where a company focuses (i.e. 
how it uses its resources) will help determine the role(s) that the board will need to 
perform and the intellectual capital it will need to undertake these roles.   
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In summary, there are five fundamental inputs into the board system; the type of 
organization and its objectives, the general legal and societal framework within which 
the organization operates, the agreed governance framework of the organization (e.g., 
its constitution), the history of the organization and the organization’s strategy.  
Together these factors determine the intellectual capital requirements and roles of the 
board.   
Outputs 
Significant debate on the structure and techniques of effective boards (e.g., 
independence of directors, senior executive remuneration techniques, etc.) has neglected 
the importance of defining board outputs (i.e. how to measure its effectiveness).  Instead 
of considering different types of board outputs as dependent variables, research has 
centred on organizational performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson; Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella, 2003) or a single group-based intermediate variable (such as 
strategic activity (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001), accepting greenmail (Kosnik, 1987) 
or CEO remuneration decisions (e.g., Rechner & Dalton, 1991)) thought to lead directly 
to organizational performance. 
Concentrating on corporate performance largely ignores the individual outputs 
and group level outputs of a board.  Understanding how boards add value to 
organizations requires an understanding of how boards contribute to three areas of 
output:  organizational outputs, group-level outputs and individual outputs.  
Corporate Outputs 
In for-profit organizations the desired output is firm performance, usually 
measured by accounting-based measures and market-based measures.  Accounting-
based measures of performance used in board studies include return on assets (Cochran 
& Wood, 1984; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994) and return on equity (Baysinger 
& Butler, 1985), while market-based measures include market to book ratio, Tobin’s q 
(Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein, 1994) or constructed indices such as the Sharpe measure 
(Hoskisson et al., 1994).   
In contrast, measures of not-for-profit organizational outputs are more varied.  
These organizations measure success by the degree to which they are meeting the 
expectations of their members as opposed to strict financial performance.  But even for 
outputs measured by financial performance, for what period of time should the board 
take responsibility?  The next quarter?  The next annual results? Or results over a five 
year period?  The answer to this question should be defined by the board, and agreed by 
the owners/members. 
The hypothesized relationship between the board and corporate performance 
illustrates the importance of defining any outputs (or dependent variables) in a 
governance model.  There is widespread agreement that the board works with and 
through the CEO (and her/his management team) (Tricker, 1994; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Conger, Lawler & Finegold, 2001).  Therefore, any relationship between the 
board and corporate performance will be mediated by the effectiveness of that 
management team.   
Attempts to identify direct relationships between corporate performance and 
boards are naïve, particularly when carried out in a cross-sectional analysis as figure 2 
demonstrates.  An effective board and an effective CEO/management team should 
produce positive performance.  In a similar fashion, poor board effectiveness and poor 
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CEO/management effectiveness will lead to poor corporate performance (an 
unsustainable position that will result in a change in the board and/or the management 
team or organizational failure). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
In the remaining two quadrants, the nature of the corporate performance 
outcome is indeterminate.  Generally, we would anticipate that an effective 
CEO/management team would result in effective corporate performance.  However, a 
sufficiently dysfunctional board may well overwhelm management’s effect on 
performance and lead to poor corporate performance (e.g., Urquhart, 2003).  The most 
complicated interaction occurs in the case of an ineffective management team and an 
effective board.  Assuming that poor management will be associated with poor 
corporate performance, but that a board acts immediately to bring the situation under 
control (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), then poor management may not translate into poor 
performance.  At its most extreme, an effective board will undertake the management 
functions of a poorly performing management team.  In any event, we expect that an 
effective board, over time, either mentors the management team to overcome the 
performance issue(s) or replaces management.  The nature of these quite different 
boardroom-management interactions highlights the importance of understanding the 
time lag between board action and corporate performance effects. 
Board Outputs 
While corporate performance is an important output from the system, so too is 
the functioning of the board (as a group) and the senior management (as a group).  
Group dynamics have a powerful effect on a team’s effectiveness and so assessing 
board focused outputs is vital to understanding how boards add value.  Additionally, 
positive group level outcomes may be a consideration of the researcher/practitioner in 
and of itself. 
Individual Outputs 
Similarly, corporate outputs are influenced by individual outputs.  Encouraging 
and creating positive outcomes such as job satisfaction, sufficient eustress (i.e. positive 
stress) and even specific affective effects may impact organizational outputs and group 
outputs, and may be desired outputs in their own right.  
The Board as a Transformation Process 
Having defined the inputs and outputs of the board system, the next step 
involves outlining the transformation process.  Given the inputs or constraints on an 
organization, how does a board implement effective governance so as to achieve 
positive outputs for the board, individuals and the organization itself?   
There are many approaches to this question.  Scholars and practitioners often 
discuss the independence of boards, the skills base of boards, the culture of the board 
and even their social contacts (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003).  Given the 
underdeveloped nature of the corporate governance agenda, there is no single way to 
describe these different board components.  The challenge is to synthesise and simplify 
these various constructs so as to describe boards and how they work.  Providing a 
synthesis will move beyond simple description and allow researchers and practitioners 
to identify patterns and phenomena that may at first appear to be random activities.   
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We view a board as a bundle of intellectual capital that enables it to enact a role 
set.  Intellectual capital is a concept of emerging interest for research scholars (e.g., see 
Bassi & Van Buren, 1999; Bontis, 1999; Brooking, 1997; Keenan & Aggestam, 2001; 
Petrash, 1996; Roos, Roos, Dragonetti, & Edvinsson, 1997; Stewart, 1997; 2001; 
Sveiby, 1997), and in applying it to the board of directors we have adapted Stewart’s 
(1997: xix-xx; 66-68) terminology to define it as:  
The intellectual resources such as knowledge, information, experience, 
relationships, routines, and procedures that a board can employ to create 
value.   
As this definition highlights, the construct captures the essential elements of 
board composition that contribute to effective performance.   
Since the board’s intellectual capital is fundamental to transforming inputs into 
organizational performance, it is necessary to understand its key components and how 
these components interact to perform the transformation process. 
Board Intellectual Capital Components 
Board intellectual capital provides a wide variety of attributes that may impact 
on effective governance.  These attributes all fall within one of four major sub-domains: 
(1) human capital, (2) social capital, (3) structural capital, and (4) cultural capital.  We 
will discuss each of these individually (see table 2 for overviews of these components) 
and highlight how each sub-domain resides at the individual or board level. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first component is the board’s human capital – that is, the individual 
knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by directors.  In undertaking any review, 
emphasis should be placed on the knowledge, skills and abilities of board members 
relevant to the organization rather than general business acumen.  Analysis of human 
capital would include a description of the basic functional, industry, board-specific and 
organization-specific knowledge, skills and abilities of the directors.  For example, what 
is the level of industry experience possessed by this board?  Is there knowledge of this 
particular organization?  What about requisite functional knowledge (e.g., 
merchandising in a retail corporation)?  And so on.   
Boards can carry out their roles when individuals apply their knowledge, skills 
and abilities to the tasks at hand.  This makes the board’s human capital the starting 
point in understanding the transformation process.  The board’s human capital dictates 
the upper limits of its capability – no amount of teamwork, processes or even ethical 
behaviour can substitute for a lack of basic ability.  Rather, all other elements of 
intellectual capital (or lack thereof) impede the use of human capital.  Ineffective 
processes, dysfunctional relationships and inappropriate ethics can only serve to reduce 
the efficacy of human capital.  For instance, ineffective processes may inhibit the flow 
of information to the board and so its human capital cannot be deployed.  Similarly, 
poisonous personal relationships (either between board members or between the board 
and management) will affect the boardroom dynamic and, again, the board’s 
deployment of human capital is degraded.     
Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship.  The longer arrow signifies that a 
board’s potential is dictated by the human capital of its members working together 
under optimal conditions – the level of knowledge, skills and experience that the board 
can bring to bear if it were to function perfectly.  The second arrow represents the 
performance of a hypothetical board.  As illustrated, a board’s actual performance will 
 12
always be less than its potential performance.  It is the other three sub-domains of 
capital – social capital, cultural capital and structural capital – that determine the size of 
the performance gap. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since board members can add value to the firm by providing access to scarce 
resources such as information (Baysinger & Zardhoohi, 1986), capital (Mizruchi & 
Stearns, 1988), power (Scott, 1991) and industry contacts (Pfeffer, 1972), the second 
component of a board’s intellectual capital is its social capital.  Social capital refers to 
the implicit and tangible set of resources available to the board by virtue of social 
relationships (adapted from Gabbay & Leenders, 1999: 3).   
To determine a board’s social capital we need to understand the key 
relationships held by board members, the nature of these relationships (e.g., is there a 
high degree of trust?) and the resources that are available as a result of these 
relationships.  Since our level of analysis is the board, there are three types of social 
capital in every board residing both within and outside the company.  First, there is 
intra-board social capital.  This capital is the “store” of goodwill that exists between 
board members and will determine the productivity of exchanges between board 
members.  Second, is board-management social capital.  As with intra-board social 
capital, this is the store of goodwill that exists between the members of the board and 
individual senior managers, most notably the CEO.  The level of capital in this 
relationship will determine the effectiveness of exchanges between the board and 
management.  Finally, there is extra-corporate social capital.  This element of social 
capital is more complex than the other two because not only does it relate to a 
relationship between corporate actors (i.e. board members and external parties who can 
supply resources such as finance, information, key inputs, etc.), but the nature and 
extent of resources that the external party can supply.  In a government corporation, for 
example, social capital may involve the information a director can garner from his or 
her contacts within a relevant government department.  In this example it is both the 
nature of the relationship between the parties (i.e. the director and the government 
employee) and the attractiveness of the resource (in this case the information that can be 
gathered legally and ethically) that are important.  
The third component of board intellectual capital is its structural capital or the 
board’s explicit and implicit codified knowledge (Bontis, 1998: 65).  Structural capital 
includes the various procedures, policies, routines, processes and methods the board has 
developed.  This structural capital can be codified and/or tacit and can be broadly 
categorized as a routine, a policy or element of board culture.  The first categorization 
of structural capital, routines, includes various mechanical aspects of the governance 
function such as how the board papers are developed, how the agenda is compiled, how 
minutes are taken and distributed, and so on.  These routines can be either explicit (i.e. 
documented) or implicit (i.e. undocumented, but a known expectation).  The second 
categorization is board policies.  Board policies are concise statements regarding the 
board’s expectations with respect to specific issues ranging from behavioural/ethical 
expectations to more routine matters.  These policies are generally recorded in either the 
minutes of the meeting when the policy is passed or consolidated into a board charter or 
policy manual.  Consequently, board policies tend to be explicit.  The third and final 
categorization of board structural capital is the board’s culture.  Board culture is a term 
used to describe the underlying values, beliefs and norms of the board (Schein, 1992).  
This will tend to be implicit and govern “the way we do things around here” (Deal & 
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Kennedy, 1988: 4).  Together, the routines, policies and culture of the board set out a 
shared set of structures that can minimize (or conversely exacerbate) the process loss of 
the board. 
The final component of the board’s intellectual capital is its cultural capital or 
the resources captured through social identification with the values, norms and rules 
sanctioned by the dominant institutions (Lin, 2001: 43).  In the case of governance, 
these values would include expectations of transparency, honesty, and so on.  It is 
subtly different from social capital in two ways.  First, cultural capital is captured by 
virtue of social identification (i.e. the identities or social categories by which people 
define themselves, e.g., gender, occupation (Tajfel, 1981)), not of relationships 
(although in certain circumstances there will be an overlap of the two).  Second, cultural 
capital deals with the degree to which board members share norms, values and rules 
within the operating environment, not each other (as in board culture).  The board’s 
“embeddedness” in the predominant culture can allow it access to resources to impact 
the transformation process.  For instance, individual board members’ reputation for 
honesty can allow them access to sensitive information even where they do not share a 
direct relationship with the person who is providing the information (which, by 
definition, is a requirement of social capital). 
Boards can therefore be conceptualized as a set of five components – the human, 
social and cultural capital of individual directors and the social and structural capitals of 
the board as a whole.  The value of the proposed framework, however, does not lie so 
much in identifying these various components.  Rather, it lies in identifying the nature 
of the interaction between them and the dynamics and relationships between the various 
components that result.  To demonstrate this issue, we must turn to the concept of board 
dynamics and congruence or fit. 
Board Dynamics and Intellectual Capital Fit 
Thus far the framework has outlined the transformational process of the board as 
a set of four interrelated components or capitals.  This approach has not offered a view 
on the dynamics of the system, most notably the behaviours of individuals within the 
governance system.  We view these behaviours or board dynamics as the interplay 
between the various components of intellectual capital.  These one-off actions result 
from the interplay between the board’s capitals and are different from the components 
themselves.  The various capitals represent different stocks (or levels) of capability that 
reside in individuals or the group and they enable the board to add value during the 
transformation process.  In contrast, board dynamics represent activities undertaken by 
system actors to change the stock of a board’s capital.  Board dynamics are the “sparks” 
that fly from the interplay between the “flints” of intellectual capital.  They occur 
because of a change in a capital component.  Similarly, a dynamic necessarily leads to 
another change in the capital of the board. 
A practical example can clarify the difference.  Suppose a new director joins the 
board.  In this case, the human capital of the board (knowledge, skills and abilities of 
the directors) has changed.  After undergoing an induction process, the director believes 
that the induction could be improved by structuring a series of one-on-one meetings 
with the CEO and senior managers. The director will then undertake a behaviour, for 
instance, raising the issue at a board meeting, which we view as a board dynamic.  This 
behaviour or dynamic will lead to a change in some component(s) of the board’s 
intellectual capital.  In this example, if the induction process changes as a result of the 
discussion, there has been a change in the board’s structural capital.  If the induction 
process is not changed, then the discussion (i.e. the dynamic) will either build or erode 
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intra-board social capital.  Either way the dynamic or behaviour is a result of, and 
results in, changes in the board’s intellectual capital. 
As this example highlights, the degree of fit or congruence between the various 
elements of board intellectual capital is critical.  This congruence can be defined as the 
level of alignment or balance between the requirements of one component in the system 
with the requirements of another component.  Board dynamics that are normatively 
described as “good” will be the result of congruent intellectual capital; the various 
components make demands on each other that are consistent and achievable.  In 
contrast, “poor” board dynamics will result from incongruence or poor fit between the 
elements. 
Consider another relatively simple example involving the board’s human capital 
and structural capital.  The type of information presented to the board and the way that 
this information is presented (i.e. structural capital) will make demands on a director’s 
knowledge, skills and abilities.  Since directors have a set level of human capital, the 
better the match (or fit) between information presentation and director ability, the 
“better” will be board dynamics and task execution.  To be even more specific, it is 
unlikely that the board of a small non-profit company would have the same ability to 
comprehend complex financial information as a large finance company.  While both 
companies need to understand their financial situations, we would expect a difference in 
how this understanding is achieved. 
The human-structural capital dynamic covers more than the interplay between 
information presentation and knowledge, skills and abilities.  Each set of relationships 
or interplays in the model will have a number of characteristics.  While a detailed 
review of each and its potential impact on effective governance are beyond the scope of 
this paper, Table 3 highlights the key elements of each relationship. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analyzing the detail of each fit will require other more specific sub-models that 
can be found in existing organizational behaviour and corporate governance research.  
As an example, Westphal (1999) identified that when directors are social contacts of the 
CEO, they are more likely to provide her/him with advice.  Thus, the social capital will 
influence the application of the human capital of the board.   The complete framework 
allows the analyst a view of collective system fit, in as much as there is a degree of fit 
between the individual components of board capital.  The intellectual capital can only 
be assessed, however, in light of its alignment with the board’s role requirements.  Thus 
the final component of the transformation process is board roles. 
Board Roles and Contingency Factors 
An effective board is one that can successfully execute the role set required of 
it.  Therefore, a sophisticated understanding of roles and the interplay between the roles 
and the company’s environment is central to any assessment of board effectiveness.  
Current research has investigated the board’s role in controlling the organization 
(Monks & Minnow, 1995), monitoring management (Bainbridge, 1993; Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Fama, 1980; Westphal, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), providing advice 
to directors (Baysinger & Butler, 1985, Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Westphal, 1999), 
assisting in development of corporate strategy (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999) and providing access to resources (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  These examples form part of an extensive stream of governance 
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research that has advanced our understanding of how boards work from the perspective 
of executing an individual role. 
Two interesting points emerge from the literature.  First, while early research 
tended to characterize boards as largely ceremonial bodies (Mace, 1971; Herman, 
1981), more recent normative and academic literature portrays the board as an 
increasingly active body seen as ultimately responsible for corporate success (Cohan, 
2002; Sonnenfeld, 2002). This more recent portrayal is also a result of changing societal 
expectations of the board.  Second, as a general rule, research has concentrated on how 
the board’s execution of a single role affects organizational performance rather than a 
relationship between execution of an integrated role set and performance.   
This absence of an integrated approach has resulted in the board’s role set being 
conceptualized in several different ways (e.g., see Hung, 1998; Johnson, et al., 1996; 
Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  While differences in 
terminology and classification systems persist, there is general agreement on three key 
activities that a board needs to fulfil (e.g., Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989)  
These three roles of the board are: (1) controlling the organization (including 
monitoring management, minimizing agency costs and establishing the strategic 
direction of the firm); (2) providing advice to management (which may include 
providing advice on strategy and is sometimes classified as a component of the control 
role), and (3) providing the firm, through personal and business contacts, access to 
resources (including access to finance, information and power). 
The ability of the board to execute these three roles will determine how 
effectively the board governs the company.  All firms will not share the same role 
requirements, however.  The specific nature and balance of board roles will vary 
depending on the inputs, that is, the company’s context and evolution (Johnson, 1997).  
For instance, if a company is the subject of alternative monitoring forces such as 
concentration of share ownership (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003: 21), 
the board may add greater value by providing salient advice to management and access 
to resources than by monitoring.  Alternatively, in complex companies the board may 
need to take a much stronger role in controlling the company. Stable industries and 
companies such as regulated utilities may require highly specialized boards that possess 
key government contacts.  Other more competitive industries may require a better-
rounded set of roles to be effectively implemented (Pfeffer, 1972).  Figure 4 provides an 
elaborated set of contingency factors. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Alignment Proposition 
The final task in explaining the framework is to highlight the critical nature of 
system alignment.  In essence we propose that the board’s effectiveness depends on the 
alignment between the various board capitals and its required role set.  Rarely will 
effective corporate governance be the function of a single component within the 
framework (e.g., human capital or social capital).  Instead, effective governance results 
from a mix of intellectual capital that enables the board to carry out a set of roles 
dictated by the company’s individual circumstances.  The challenge in governance is, 
therefore, to understand the roles required of the board and then match the intellectual 
capital of the board to those roles. 
As a key input in the framework, strategy dictates that a board also requires 
alignment with the internal and external environment.  By definition, the board will be 
 16
most effective when it can respond to external environment demands such as changes in 
legislation, the competitive environment and broader socio-economic trends.  Board 
effectiveness will also depend on the relationship between the board and the governed 
company.  For instance, fit is required between the board and the culture, people and 
systems of the organization.  By and large, this fit will be evident both as key impacts 
on the required role set and on the fit of specific elements of intellectual capital. 
An important implication of the framework is that diagnosing corporate 
governance problems involves a holistic understanding of the entire system.  This 
overarching view of the system allows for a deeper understanding of the concerns 
facing a board and a consequent analysis of fit is more likely to determine the cause(s) 
of those problems.  Importantly, as highlighted in the system characteristic of 
equifinality, the framework also recognizes that different combinations of key 
components can be used to achieve the same outputs.  Therefore, the problem is not to 
find the “one best way” of governing, but rather to understand how effective 
combinations of intellectual capital fit together and lead to congruence with a firm’s 
needs. 
The intellectual capital model provides researchers and practitioners with a 
general organizing framework or meta theory.  Board specialists and researchers will 
require more specific “submodels” to help them define high or low fit in specific 
circumstances (Nadler & Tushman, 1980).  Examples of submodels that might be used 
in the context of this framework include: (1) agency theory to assess the fit between 
monitoring, human capital and board-management social capital, (2) stewardship theory 
to assess the fit between providing advice, board-management relationships and cultural 
capital, (3) resource dependence theory to assess the fit between providing access to 
resources and the social capital of individual directors, and (4) institutional theory to 
assess the fit between the board’s inputs and its other organizational components.  These 
theories are not meant to be a comprehensive list of submodels, but provide insight into 
how the general model comprises extant corporate governance research. 
The other key attraction of the framework is that it recognizes the trade-off 
between the various attributes of a board.  Boosting a board’s human capital may come 
at the expense of its board social capital (e.g., recruiting new members for specific skills 
may lead to process loss as a result of a larger board or it may even lead to a 
deterioration in board relationships (i.e. intra-board social capital)).  Thus, it provides an 
organizing framework for the researcher in terms of research design and interpretation 
of data and for the practitioner in terms of essential areas for investigation and 
intervention. 
Figure 5 illustrates the general framework for board analysis that we have 
described.  The board can be conceptualized as a system that transforms inputs into 
outputs – a process that is facilitated by its intellectual capital and is contingent on the 
roles required of it.  The fit between these components is the crucial dynamic that we 
need to understand if we want to know how boards work.  Having described the model, 
the next section outlines how it can be used to analyze board problems.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Board Problem Diagnosis 
Since boards and their directors face constantly changing circumstances they are 
continuously involved in identifying and solving problems; they are constantly 
assessing their effectiveness against desired levels of performance in order to identify 
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problems and develop interventions designed to align actual and desired performance 
levels.  To assist in this process we have developed a ten-step generic problem-solving 
process that uses the intellectual capital framework to identify governance problems and 
generate possible interventions (adapted from Nadler & Tushman, 1980: 48)).  In this 
section we describe each step in the process and demonstrate how the intellectual capital 
framework can be applied to real world governance problems.  The steps are: 
 
1. Symptom identification: the first stage involves collecting data on the 
problem(s) that the board faces.  At this stage, the investigator is seeking to 
identify data that indicate that there is a problem(s), rather than where the 
problem lies or what the problem actually is.  This is because symptomatic data 
may indicate where to look for more complete data rather than lead to the 
immediate identification of problems. 
2. Input specification: With the symptoms identified, the next stage in the problem 
solving process is to identify the key influences on the board’s transformation 
process.  This will involve collecting data on the type of organization that the 
board governs, the legislative and societal framework within which it operates, 
the constitutional and voluntary agreements governing its operation along with 
an assessment of historical influences.  This stage will also involve 
understanding and elaborating the strategy of the organization – its vision, 
mission and values along with supporting objectives and strategies. 
3. Output identification: After examining the system inputs, it is necessary to 
identify the desired system outputs.  As previously outlined, these outputs may 
occur at the individual, group and organizational level.  First, it is necessary to 
outline the organizationally preferred outputs.  Second, it is necessary to gather 
data to ascertain the board’s realized output for comparison with the desired 
outcomes. 
4. Problem Identification:  After gathering actual system outcomes, it is necessary 
to identify the divergence between desired and actual outcomes.  While this may 
build upon step 1 of the process (i.e. the symptom identification) it is a more 
rigorous analysis with the objective of problem (as opposed to symptom) 
analysis.  Thus, the problem(s) may occur at several places in the governance 
system.  Note that this comparison will tell us where the problem exists, but not 
necessarily its cause(s). 
5. Describe the Board’s Intellectual Capital: With the problem identified, the next 
step begins to investigate its cause(s).  The starting point is a description of the 
four key components of board intellectual capital.  This involves describing the 
board’s human capital, social capital, structural capital and cultural capital, 
including the nature and essential characteristics of each component. 
6. Describe the Board’s Role Set: The next step involves understanding the roles 
currently being undertaken by the board.   
7. Assess Board Role Fit: Following a description of the board’s role set, it is 
necessary to begin assessing the fit of the company’s governance system.  The 
first step is to review the fit between the board’s role set and company needs.  A 
review of the internal and external operating environments and alignment with 
strategy can inform this stage. 
8. Assess Intellectual Capital–Board Role Fit: Step 8 involves assessing the 
positive or negative fit between the components identified in the previous three 
steps.  This assessment is undertaken by applying submodels or theories (e.g., 
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agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, etc.) to the data 
collected in steps 5 to 7. 
9. Develop hypotheses: With components and fit assessed, this step involves 
developing an understanding of the relationships between the patterns of fit and 
the firm outputs.  In essence, this stage links the problem identification of step 4 
with the analysis of fit in steps 5 to 8.  The outcome should be a proposed 
linkage between the elements of the board’s intellectual capital, its required role 
set and the observed company outputs. 
10. Develop action steps: The final step in the problem solving process is to develop 
a series of action steps aimed to resolve the problems caused by the lack of 
congruence.  As with any problem solving approach, it will be necessary to 
implement and monitor the impact of the chosen course of action. 
 
The intellectual capital framework and the associated ten-step problem solving 
process are aids in understanding and managing the complex relationships that exist 
within the governance of modern organizations.  Since both companies and social 
systems are unique, dynamic and indeterminate it is impossible to provide a generic 
solution to governance problems.  The model and process do, however, allow 
practitioners a framework for making interventions and determining the consequences 
of those interventions.   
Future Directions  
In many ways, this framework raises more questions than it answers.  By 
presenting a novel perspective on boards, many questions remain unexplored.  Are all 
the key components identified in this framework?  Are the relationships outlined the key 
elements for understanding how boards work?  These specific questions highlight the 
often-overlooked fact that directors are a small social group that is part of a highly 
dynamic system – a complex and evolving array of political, social, legal and economic 
factors (Leighton & Thain, 1997).  While these and related questions are valid 
challenges to our framework, we hope that it provides a starting point for such a 
discussion.  Having a framework is normally a prerequisite for social science research – 
and this has been our starting point.  The lack of a generalized problem-solving 
framework for boards suggests that we do not have a basic functional understanding of 
how boards work (Nadler & Tushman, 1980) and we hope the framework presented 
here goes some small way to advancing our understanding.   
This framework may also lead to an understanding of the generalized types of 
problems a board faces and the patterns of causes of those problems.  While all 
governance situations are unique, we need to investigate whether there are basic 
problems that all boards face.  Is there some method of categorization that we can use to 
diagnose these problems and suggest remedial interventions?  Similarly, it may be 
possible to isolate specific conditions, such as regulated industries where a board role 
may be more or less important (e.g., Pettigrew, 1992). Alternatively, it may be possible 
to link a particular element of board intellectual capital with the provision of a specific 
board role(s).  The application of the model will, we hope, lead to benefits in our 
governance systems. 
From a practitioner perspective, the framework can provide a useful device for 
assessing board performance and has the potential to improve corporate performance 
through the resultant improvement in board role execution.  It may also assist boards 
and their advisers to assess their particular board composition needs and to construct the 
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relevant process-related interventions to meet these needs and improve board 
performance.   
Summary 
Corporate governance is assuming an increasingly important place in organizational 
life.  As an organization’s ultimate decision-making body, the board is inexorably 
linked to corporate performance.  This article has attempted to present a generalized 
framework and process to assist us to conceptualize how boards work and what we can 
do to improve board and consequent firm performance.  It is a way of conceptualizing 
boards, but clearly not the only way of thinking about boards.  Similarly, we would not 
claim that it is the definitive framework for analyzing boards.  Instead, we hope this 
framework can assist researchers to investigate the complexities of boardroom life, 
assist policy makers develop laws and regulations which will improve organizational 
performance, and help directors and their advisers to develop and maintain effective 
boards. 
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Figure 1: Simple board transformation framework 
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Figure 2: Board/Management Performance Interaction 
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Figure 3:  Representation of process loss in board capability 
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Figure 4: Contingency factors impacting on board role requirements 
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Table 1: Key inputs to the board performance relationship 
Input Definition Critical Feature for Analysis 
Organization Type Underlying purpose of the organization (e.g., government 
corporation, listed corporation, not-for-profit organization, 
statutory authority, university etc.) 
1. Is there a unified articulated organizational purpose shared 
by owners, boards and managers? 
2. Are there multiple constituencies within the ownership or 
membership structure? 
Legislative and Societal 
Framework 
Society endorsed rules that govern the operation of this 
organization 
1. What are the major laws and societal customs within which 
the board must act? 
2. Are there any specific legal duties/ framework/ customs for 
this organization? 
Constitution Governance agreements that govern the organization that 
were agreed by the corporate owners  
1. What are the legally enforceable elements of board 
operation specified by the company’s constitution? 
2. Are there any other agreements that impinge on the board’s 
function? 
History1 Patterns of past activity, behaviour and effectiveness of the 
organization that may effect current board structure and 
functioning 
1. What have been the major stages or phases of 
organizational development? 
2. What is the impact of these stages on board makeup and 
functioning? 
3. How do the current corporate culture, values, behaviours 
and decision-making processes affect board performance? 
Strategy Strategy is the way in which a company uses its resources 1. What is the organization’s core mission? 
2. What strategies has the organization employed to achieve 
its core mission? 
3. What objectives have been set for organizational 
performance? 
1Adapted from Nadler & Tushman, 1980 
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Table 2: Key Components of Board Intellectual Capital 
 
Component Human Capital Social Capital Structural Capital Cultural Capital 
Definition 
Innate and learned 
abilities, expertise and 
knowledge (adapted 
from Castanias & Helfat, 
2001: 662) 
Implicit and tangible set 
of resources available 
by virtue of relevant 
social relationships  
(adapted from Gabbay 
& Leenders, 1999: 3) 
Explicit and implicit 
codified knowledge 
(e.g., routines, 
policies and 
procedures) (see 
Bontis, 1998: 65) 
Implicit and tangible 
resources available by 
identification with the 
values, norms and rules 
sanctioned by the 
dominant group (e.g., 
honesty) (Lin, 2001: 43) 
Resides in 
 Individual Directors  Individual 
Directors 
 Board 
 Board  Individual Directors 
Key Dimensions 
1. General knowledge 
2. Industry experience 
3. Organisational 
experience 
4. Board experience 
5. Company specific 
knowledge and 
experience 
6. Functional experience 
and knowledge 
7. General business 
knowledge and 
experience 
1. Network of extra 
organisational 
contacts – scope of 
resources and 
nature of contacts 
2. Relationship(s) 
with CEO, both as 
a board and as 
individuals 
3. Relationships 
between board 
members 
1.Documented board 
policies including 
manuals, charters 
and guidelines 
2. Board culture 
3. Implicit board 
procedures and 
norms 
1. Individual work norms 
2. Individual morals 
3. Individual motivations 
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Table 3: Analysis of Intellectual Capital Fit 
 
Fit Key Questions 
Human Capital/Structural 
Capital 
• Do the policies, procedures and culture make best 
use of the board’s knowledge, skills and ability as a 
group?  Do policies, procedures and culture make 
the most of each individual director’s knowledge, 
skills and abilities? 
Human Capital/Social 
Capital 
• Is there sufficient trust on the board for the most to 
be made of director’s capabilities?  Do 
relationships encourage the use of the board’s 
talents by management?  Do Directors understand 
how they can put their contacts to work for the 
company? 
Human Capital/Cultural 
Capital 
• Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board 
support the best use of the board’s capabilities?  
How do the group’s values, norms, and beliefs 
affect a director’s willingness to use his /her 
capabilities? 
Social Capital/Structural 
Capital 
• Do policies, procedures, and culture build trust in 
the boardroom?  Between the board and managers?  
Between the board and external organisations? 
Social Capital/Cultural 
Capital 
• Do the values, norms, beliefs of the group match 
those of society?  
• Do the individuals share values, norms, beliefs? 
• Do these match management’s values, norms, 
beliefs? 
Structural 
Capital/Cultural Capital 
• Do policies, procedures, culture match societal 
expectations? 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The framework outlined in this paper can apply to boards, or groups legally charged with the 
responsibility for an organization, be this a for-profit, a not-for-profit, or government corporation.  Such 
organizations are created by a variety of statutes in most sovereign states.  The key hallmark of such 
organisations is that the final legal responsibility for the direction and control of the organization rests 
collectively in a team of people and not just an individual.  Hence the term “board” in the paper refers to 
such teams. 
2 Agency costs arise in organizations where the owners are not the managers of the firm.  Typically, the 
interests of the owners (maximising shareholder returns) do not wholly match the interests of managers.  
Given various attributes of the management-shareholder relationship (such as information asymmetry), 
the owners of the firm will need to employ mechanisms to minimise their losses from this lack of 
alignment.  One way of minimising losses is to implement a board of directors to oversee shareholder 
interests. 
3 Encouragingly, issues such as board performance reviews (Higgs Review) and structuring the board to 
improve performance (ASX Guidelines) are appearing on the agenda, but they tend to be a minority and 
not clearly defined. 
4 For example, some for-profit organizations have specific social objectives (e.g. the Body Shop) while 
some not-for-profit organizations (e.g., Greenpeace) have specific elements of their operations that are 
undertaken to make a profit to spend in other areas. 
